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Summary: The Svalbard Treaty and its claimed ‘extended-reach’ juris-
diction incorporating both the continental shelf and exclusive econom-
ic zone (EEZ) – ie a fisheries protection zone (FPZ) – is an international 
law puzzle. Disputes regarding the Treaty’s jurisdictione ratione ter-
rae results from interpretative differences. My findings are as follows: 
the Treaty’s concept of ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ refers to the 
one-time jurisdiction transfer that occurred in April 1925. 
The notion of ‘territorial waters’ attracts both an historic (static) and 
evolutionary (dynamic) reading. Regarding its material content, we are 
faced with the first category. Considering geographic reach, evolution-
ary reading takes over. ‘Territorial water’ jurisdictione ratione terrae 
is a generic form whose reach, which is at most 12 nautical miles, is 
dynamic. The treaty does not prevent Norway from unilaterally decid-
ing whether to enforce this maximum, or a less extensive, area. 
While territorial sea jurisdiction due to the development of interna-
tional law may extend to 12 nautical miles, it cannot creep to 200 
nautical miles. Due to substantial variations, the EEZ cannot qualify 
as a similar zone adjoining the territorial sea. 
Further; it is difficult to argue that its reach should include areas be-
yond the territorial sea of Svalbard due to the very fact that its reach 
is limited to the ‘Svalbard Box’. Coastal state jurisdiction beyond the 
Box is not granted in the Svalbard Treaty but results from the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).
 
1 ‘Travail préparatoire’, interpretation and positions: a general 
approach
‘To a student to modern politics it will appear 
that … the actual sovereign is, given time, 
almost certain to become the legal.’
Sir Geoffrey Butler1
This article examines two key juridical facts: ‘full and absolute sov-
ereignty’ (article 1) and ‘territorial waters’ (article 2) as expressed in the 
*  Professor of Jurisprudence, UIT Arctic University of Norway, Tromsö.
1 Geoffrey Butler, ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’ in The British Year Book of Inter-
national Law (Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton 1920-21) 35.
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1920 Svalbard Treaty. Are these of an evolutionary kind to be interpreted 
according to the ‘inter-temporal law’ principle (parts 1.3 and 2.4-2.5)? 
As revealed, the Treaty does not require one solution suitable for all the 
Treaty’s notions. Each text subscribes to a solution of its own.
1.1 Introductory remarks
The Svalbard Treaty serves both as a legal platform for Norway’s sov-
ereignty over the archipelago and also bestows limitations on its jurisdic-
tion. Norway thus possesses residual rights (part 1.4).
While Svalbard is indeed a part of the Kingdom of Norway, as set 
forth in the 1920 Treaty, the Svalbard legal system is in its complexity an 
‘intricate nuisance’.2 Clashing treaty interpretations have caused ‘nas-
cent tensions’.3 The Treaty raises ‘fundamental and abiding issues’,4 to 
the list of which, I argue, belongs the puzzle of the possible application of 
the Treaty to marine areas beyond Svalbard territorial waters, ie whether 
treaty-based equal rights to mining, fishing and other natural resource 
extraction relates to the continental shelf and the Fisheries Protection 
Zone (FPZ).  
The key issue is how the Treaty, covering ‘all the islands … in their 
territorial waters’ (article 1) situated between 74°N-81°N & 10°E-35°E 
(the ‘Svalbard Box’)5 justifies treaty-based jurisdiction beyond the territo-
rial sea. The ‘jurisdictione ratione terrae6 long-reach proponents’ maintain 
that the FPZ is under Svalbard jurisdiction due either to logical 7 or natu-
ral application8 and include the continental shelf in their claim. I seek to 
clarify this position at its core.
This concept should not be mixed up with ‘extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion’, which refers to internal law competences vis-à-vis own subjects 
2 A rather common position in 1920. See RN Rudmose Brown, Spitsbergen. An Account of 
Exploration, Hunting, the Mineral Riches & Future Potential of an Arctic Archipelago (London 
Seeley Service & Co, Ltd 1920) 299.
3 Diana Wallis ‘Introduction’ (2011) 1 Arctic papers - The Spitsbergen Treaty. Multilateral 
Governance in the Arctic’ 6.
4 RY Jennings, Book Review:  ‘lnternational Law, The Collected Papers of Hersch Lauter-
pacht, vols I & II’ (1976) 13 Cambridge Law Journal 165.
5 Treaty between Norway, the United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and Sweden [‘the signatories’] relating to Spits-
bergen of 9 February 1920. This delimitation was identical to the Norwegian position prior 
to the Peace conference discussions.  See Exposé des Questions Soumises à la Conférence 
de la Paix par le Ministre de Norvège à Paris au Nom du Gouvernement Norvégien (Paris, 10 
April 1919) 2.
6 See esp Wallis (n 3). See also authors referred to in nn 7 and 8.
7 DH Anderson, ‘The Status Under International Law of the Maritime Areas around Sval-
bard’ (2009) 40(4) Ocean Development and International Law 373, 374, 380.
8 Geir Ulfstein, The Svalbard Treaty: From Terra Nullius to Norwegian Sovereignty (Scandi-
navian University Press 1996) 125, 127, 140, 366, 411, 424, 429, 479.
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situated beyond the territory of the directing state. Neither should it be 
confused with ‘extraterritoriality’ which signifies the position of being ex-
empted from domicile jurisdiction, even if situated on that state’s terri-
tory, usually resulting from diplomatic negotiations.9
This is no historical or political study.10 The Svalbard delimitation 
towards the high seas, deep ocean bed or adjacent states11 is also beyond 
the scope of this article.
This study skips the material issues related to Svalbard harvesting 
rights (cf the French position which holds that ‘the citizens of all the Signa-
tories will have the same fishing and hunting rights in the territory of the 
archipelago and in its territorial waters’.12 No parties seem to deny the ex-
istence of non-discriminatory harvesting rights to Member States citizens, 
an undisputed position which will not be subject to further analysis here.
But how to resolve the Svalbard Treaty puzzles? Opinions vary. 
Whether Norway is a mutatis mutandis trusteeship or mandate was dis-
cussed previous to the 1920 Treaty (part 1.2) but has also emerged more 
recently.13 
Most jurists reject the terra nullius description of Svalbard, ie a ‘terri-
tory belonging to no one’.14 The core characteristic of such an area is the 
lack of public possession and jurisdiction. A terra nullius regime consists 
of both a terra nullius area as well as terra nullius rights. Hence, the rules 
9 See as an illustration Philip R Abbey, ‘Treaty Ports & Extraterritoriality in 1920s China. 
General Discussion and Table of Contents’ (1997) (user-generated website) <www.oocities.
org/treatyport01/TREATY01.html> accessed 25 October 2016.
10 For a comprehensive analysis, see Christopher R Rossi, ‘“A Unique International Prob-
lem”: The Svalbard Treaty, Equal Enjoyment, and Terra Nullius: Lessons of Territorial 
Temptation from History’ (2015) 15 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 93, 
with further references.
11 See Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). Outer limits of the conti-
nental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission: 
Submission by the Kingdom of Norway ANNEX VI, United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Summary of the recommendations 
of the commission on the limits of the continental shelf in regard to the submission made by 
Norway in respect of areas in the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea and the Norwegian Sea on 27 
November 2006. Recommendations prepared by the Subcommission established for the con-
sideration of the submission made by Norway.  Adopted by the Subcommission on 13 March 
2009, and submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for consider-
ation and approval by the Commission. Adopted by the Commission on 27 March 2009, with 
amendments. See also, the bilateral agreement of 15 September 2010 between Norway and 
Russia on the marine delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and Polar Sea.
12 Chambre des Députés, Session de 1924, ‘Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des 
Affaires Etrangères. Chargée d’examiner le Projet de Loi Portant approbation de traité rela-
tive au Spitzberg, signé à Paris le 9 février 1920’ 16. Citation taken from the Archive of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD jnr 20970/1924) in the Norway National Archive, 
Box JD, Dc-0084.
13 As told, for example, by Wallis (n 3). 
14 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den v Nor) (1933) PCIJ (Series A/B) No 53, 63. See 
also the Western Sahara case (1975) ICJ 12, 38-39.
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of domicile governing terra nullius located individuals. Clearly, Svalbard is 
not terra nullius and I thus refrain from commenting further on the issue. 
1.2 Background incidents leading up to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty
The WWI negotiations between Norway and Great Britain, Sweden 
and the Netherlands on Norway’s role in holding a mandate failed and 
never again gained momentum.15 Generally, the participants believed 
that Norway was the right country to trust, but only as a country holding 
a mandate assigned by the League of Nations. All that said, this never 
became the outcome. Here is why.
Versailles rejected the mandate bid.  During WWI, Norway changed 
its mind.  In 1919, by ‘ingenious diplomacy’, Norway succeeded ‘in ac-
complishing the ancient Norwegian claim on sovereignty over the 
archipelago’.16 France and the USA, through US Secretary of State, Rob-
ert Lansing,17 championed the Norwegian stance.18 The Spitsbergen Com-
mission ‘decided …unanimously, against which decision the powers most 
directly concerned made no objection. Soviet objections were forthcoming 
later’.19 The Spitsbergen Supreme Council adopted the Commission rec-
ommendation on 25 September 1919. Thus, sovereignty was the choice.
This begs the question regarding the deadlock on the limited Nor-
wegian jurisdiction beyond the territorial waters: being one among many 
coastal states, what is so special about Norway and its right to adjoining 
zones of exclusive self-rule (part 2)? 
At the time of the Svalbard Treaty proposal (1919), its signing (1920), 
and its ratification (1925), its ‘geographic scope’ was a done deal, simply 
due to the fact that the Treaty’s limitations were fixed to areas within 
the specific longitude and latitude explicitly mentioned in the treaty text 
(74°N-81°N & 10°E-35°E). This is and was a clear-cut definition, giving 
15 Trygve Mathisen, Svalbard i internasjonal politikk [Svalbard in International Politics] 
1871-1925 (Aschehoug 1951) 201, 202, and esp. 209 (translations from Norwegian docu-
ments and literature are by the author of this piece, here as well as in the following texts).
16 Riksarkivet [Norway, National Archive] Utenriksdepartementet [Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs] Boks 6166A, P1 Brev 12 april 1919, fra legasjonen i Berlin til Utenriksministeren i 
Kristiania [Letter from the Norwegian Embassy in Berlin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
in the Norwegian Capital of Kristiania (since 1924 given its ancient name Oslo)], ‘ … at det 
maatte lykkes et behändig diplomati at faa gjennemdrevet Norges gamle krav paa overhøi-
het over Øgruppen’.
17 At first Lansing promoted a system of international governance. See Mathisen (n 15) 
180.
18 Elen C Singh, The Spitsbergen (Svalbard) Question: United States Foreign Policy, 1907-
1935 (Universitetsforlaget 1980). Willy Østreng, Økonomi og politisk suverenitet. Inter-
essespillet om Svalbards politiske status (Universitetsforlaget 1974) [Economy and Political 
Sovereignty, Power Politics of the Svalbard Political Status] 42-44. The author claims that 
Norway gained from US policy to prevent too expansive British power after WWI. 
19 See Singh (n 18) 103 with further references to the primary sources.
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no leeway to discretionary power. Obviously, this notion of longitude po-
sitions has no evolutionary components. No one – not even the most pa-
triotic Norwegians – would allege that the 1920 Treaty included not only 
the islands within the Svalbard Box but also territories beyond the box.
Nor did the Russians. This was made clear shortly after the Nor-
wegians achieved sovereignty over the archipelago. With regard to the 
adjacent Victoria Island and Franz Joseph Land, the ‘Decree on the An-
nexation of Lands and Islands Located in the Northern Arctic Ocean as 
Territory of the USSR of 15 April 1926’20 ignored the Norwegian plea for 
full sovereignty over these areas. The Soviets pronounced as national ter-
ritory the discovered and undiscovered islands east of a sector line from 
the western point of the former Soviet Union (Cape Niemetsky) to the 
North Pole. Until then, Franz Joseph Land was considered terra nullius. 
This new territorial claim was notified to the Norwegian Government 
on 6 May 1926. Not only was Franz Joseph Land annexed, but the Soviet 
Union also made explicit its reservations against Norwegian statehood 
over Svalbard.21 The Norwegian reply of 19 December 1928 announced 
that these islands belonged to Norway: 
The Norwegian Government hereby reserves its position regarding 
still not discovered islands … and especially reserves its position 
with regard to Franz Joseph Land. This group of islands was first 
discovered by Norwegians… and was given the name of ‘North East 
Spitsbergen.22
The Norwegian reply shows that Norway’s sovereignty claim to the 
adjacent Franz Joseph Land was a territorial claim, unrelated to the 1920 
Treaty of Svalbard. 
The Soviet Union ignored Norway’s claim to Franz Joseph Land, as 
no response was ever given. Besides, not a single objection by the inter-
national society of states – beyond Norway’s negative reply – was made, 
and thus the Soviet Union’s 1926 proclamation was tacitly recognised. 
The expelling of Norwegian vessels hunting for seals in Franz Joseph 
Land some few years later confirmed the formal situation.23
Even the Norwegian occupation of Victoria Island, close to, but be-
yond, the Svalbard Box, failed to gain international support. No single 
20 For more details, see WE Butler, Northeast Arctic Passage (Sijthoff & Noordhoff 1978) 
174. For its present status in international law, see Peter Ørebech, ‘The Barents Sea 2010 
Norway-Russia Border: The Triumph of the Negotiation Principle at the Expense of the Me-
dian- and Sector Line Pretentions’ (2012) 4 Yearbook of Polar Law 505.
21 The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD jnr 12649/26 vol I) – Document in 
the Norwegian National Archive.
22 The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD jnr 19082/28 vol II) and the Rus-
sian reply (UD jnr 13269/30 vol IV) – Document in the Norwegian National Archive.
23 ibid.
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nation state was thus supportive of any attempt from Norway in its uni-
lateral territory expansion. 
1.3 Theoretical, methodical and interpretational disagreements
How to interpret the Svalbard Treaty text? Did the signatories and 
parties to the treaty intend to supply the international society of states 
with continuous power, overlooking Norway’s initiation and implementa-
tion of jurisdiction? Is Norwegian sovereignty in need of recurrent confir-
mation? Is Norway, as of such restrictions, excluded from enjoying new 
developments in the Law of the Sea?
The focus here is on the concept of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territorial wa-
ters’. Several interpretative styles appear. Studying legal literature on 
Svalbard, the source of disagreement seems to substantiate diverse inter-
pretative styles. Let us consider the different opinions.
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) holds 
that if words are distinct, the natural reading of the texts decides the 
matter (article 31.1). In other words, we subscribe to the normal un-
derstanding of the utterances (the ‘utterance meaning’). With this read-
ing, the intention of the parties will be unleashed. A study conducted 
by Trygve Mathisen24 gives insights into the intent of the signatories, an 
issue further elaborated in parts 2.2, 2.4, and especially in 1.6. If textual 
interpretation is judicious, the interpretation process is successful and 
the valid legal rule is uncovered.
If disputed, the interpretation should consider the treaty’s object 
and purpose (article 31.1), as well as conduct contextual analysis or sup-
plementary means of interpretation such as the entire bulk of texts, pre-
amble and annexes, additional commentaries that are treaty relevant and 
other instruments related to the treaty (article 31.2).
If still unclear due to obscurity or ambiguity, the judge has recourse 
to the “travail préparatoire” (article 32). It is appropriate to incorporate 
this legal source if the textual and contextual reading fails to produce a 
reasonable or acceptable result. 
Static interpretation takes the contemporary reading at the time of 
origin as the basis, searching for the historical understanding of the dis-
puted international law text. 
Sometimes, concepts are dynamic legal standards, varying with 
changing times, often named ‘evolutionary concepts’.  Then, subsequent 
developments promote a changed understanding, including succeeding 
agreements or practices (article 31.3). 
24 Mathisen (n 15) 201ff.
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However, inter-temporal reading is inappropriate if it is at odds with 
the parties’ intentions stated by the treaty’s conclusion. Similarly, evolu-
tionary reading is inapt in the case of discord with the treaty’s object or 
purpose. Judge Rosalyn Higgins (ICJ) purported that ‘evolutionary reading’ 
cannot overrule the ‘intention of the parties reflected by reference to object 
and purpose – that guides the law of treaties’. 25 In the same way, Ian Sin-
clair advocates that if evolutionary interpretation is apt it ‘… must always 
be on condition that such an evolutionary interpretation does not conflict 
with the intentions and expectations of the parties as they may have been 
expressed during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the treaty’.26
Sorting out which style is appropriate in interpreting different texts 
is challenging: case law prescribes that static interpretation is applicable 
when the dispute relates to juridical facts. A connotation is made when 
the text is interpreted in the light of contemporary law at the time of the 
signing and ratification of the treaty. One illustration is Judge Max Hu-
ber’s statement: ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the 
law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a 
dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled’.27 Another follows from 
Judge Klaestad’s majority votum of 1960: ‘It is sufficient to state that the 
validity of a treaty concluded as long ago as the last quarter of the eight-
eenth century… should not be judged upon the basis of practices and 
procedures which have since developed only gradually’.28 This excludes 
contemporary law at the time of the dispute settlement from being valid 
or relevant as a basis of interpretation. 
This platform, however, does not eliminate all treaty texts from dy-
namic reading. As stated in the Island of Palmas case, inter-temporal law 
is pertinent in justifying the continuous manifestation of a right. This 
derives from the fact that ancient rules are modified over the years. This 
raises the issue of ‘effectiveness’. It is, however, disputed whether this 
distinction is valid international law: 
The arbitrator’s reasoning seems to contradict the concept of title. If 
Spain owned the island in the 16th century, then unless its ownership 
was displaced by another State, it should continue to be the owner. 
A mere change in the international rule regarding sovereignty over 
25 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law’. 
In Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski (Kluwer Law Interna-
tional 1996) 181.
26 I Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press 
1984) 140.
27 See Island of Palmas case (United States v the Netherlands) Perm Ct Arb, 2 UN Rep Intl 
Arb Awards 829 (1928) 845.
28 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) judgment, 12 April 1960, ICJ  Rep 
1960, 37.
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territories, without a factual change, should not suffice to change 
title.29  
Irrespective of the correctness of the Huber distinction, the concept 
of ‘territorial waters’ exemplifies both evolutionary and static law.  Geo-
graphic reach has been altered over the years from the cannon width of 
3 nautical miles as a maximum, creeping up to 4 nautical miles (in Den-
mark-Norway) and later to 12 nautical miles (the Soviet Union), which 
has also finally become the present international rule of law. While the 
notion in the jurisdictione ratione materiae stance is static and thus has 
remained unchanged over the years, the notion of ‘territorial water’ ra-
tione terra is evolutionary. Otherwise, if the treaty parties had settled the 
width to 8 nautical miles as originally recommended, the provision would 
have been static.
1.4 The principle of sovereign states’ residual jurisdictional rights 
The principle of residual rights, which is the basis of the 1920 sover-
eignty theory that lies beneath the Svalbard Treaty provisions, is a basic 
principle of international law. If signatories maintained strict limitations 
on Norway’s supremacy, they should have put them in writing. Any other 
approach is wishful thinking. Member States with ambitions for future 
maneuvering should have put off signing the treaty until they had the 
terms they wanted and should not by accession have subscribed to ‘ni 
condition ni reserve’. Future legislation would then acquire a joint rul-
ing. However, no such claim was ever part of the treaty. No Norwegian 
legislation has resulted from joint rule (condominium), as will be further 
explained below.
Norway’s position, as expressed by the Ministry of Justice, is as fol-
lows: ‘It is my opinion that by accepting the Svalbard Treaty, Norway has 
acquiesced in binding legal rights to all proprietors, including Norwe-
gians, as mentioned in Article 3’.30
Thus, one should differentiate between the present and future eco-
nomic activity on the islands. The 1920 signatories expressed no am-
bition regarding future exploitation of resources, commerce or income 
flows to the benefit of their own subjects. Continuous utilisation and 
harvesting was granted, but new future activities were fully under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Norway. Its future rule-making did not concern 
the signatories. 
29 Anthony D’Amato, ‘International Law, Intertemporal Problems’ in Rudolf Bernhardt (ed), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (North-Holland Publishing 1992) 1235.
30 PM Law Department J No 108-26E by the Department Head of Division, Ministry of Jus-
tice, Mr Harbek of 27 December 1948 (JD  Dc-0086, 1930-60, National Archive of Norway). 
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Ulfstein posits that among Norwegian residual rights are ‘activities 
not covered by the non-discrimination regime, [and] Norway has the right 
to prohibit and restrict activities on a discriminatory basis’.31 Accord-
ingly, in the case of exploitation, activities and trades not previously car-
ried out, Norway may retain Svalbard’s harvesting gains for Norwegian 
subjects. 
Against this backdrop, the framework of basic competences of sover-
eign states in general, and Norway’s Svalbard competence in particular, 
should be resolved.  
1.5 ‘Judicial legislation’: a lacuna-based system of law 
At times, conflicts trigger non-codified issues. Disputes arise out of 
lacunae, or loopholes in the law. Courts settle disputes with little or no 
basis in treaty language.
The geographic scope of the Svalbard Treaty is such an issue. Is non-
liquet an answer? As told by ICJ Judge Vereshchtin, where lacunae exist, 
courts should not decide the issue. ‘In advisory procedure, where the 
Court finds a lacuna in the law or finds the law to be imperfect’, Veresh-
chtin stated, ‘it ought merely to state this without trying to fill the lacuna 
or improve the law by way of judicial legislation’.32 
International courts, however, refrain from adapting non-liquet re-
sponses. Judge Higgins’ methodical approach is such an example. Inter-
national law is a comprehensive system without loopholes. Instead, ‘the 
judge’s role is …to decide which of two… norms is applicable … As these 
rules indubitably exist, there can be no question of judicial legislation’.33 
Judge Higgins meets the challenges of lacunae by applying customary or 
general principles of law. There is not always ‘a clear and specific legal 
rule readily applicable to every international situation, but … every in-
ternational situation is capable of being determined as a matter of law’.34
These sources of law ‘preclude the Court from pleading non liquet 
in any given case before it’.35 Max Huber set the norm in a 1928 Arbitra-
tional Award: 
For since an agreement’s… object [is] to ‘terminate’ the dispute, it 
is the evident will of the Parties that the arbitral award shall not 
31 Ulfstein (n 8) 290.
32 Vladen S Vereshchtin, Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Rep 1996, 280.
33 Rosalyn Higgins, Nuclear Weapons, Advisory opinion, ICJ Rep 1996.
34 R Jennings and A Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th edn, vol 1, Longman 
1992) 13.
35 TO Elias, The International Court of Justice and Some Contemporary Problems (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 1983) 14.
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conclude by a ‘non liquet’, but shall in any event decide that the 
island forms a part of the territory of one or the other of two litigant 
Powers.36 
The litigants of the Island of Palmas case make a parallel of the Sval-
bard dispute for the purposes of the ratione terrae issue. The right to 
establish an EEZ/FPZ and continental shelf surrounding Svalbard are 
either part of Norway’s exclusive autonomy or are under the Svalbard 
regime. A third legal alternative – ie legal lacunae – does not exist.
1.6 The interpretative style of treaties, the Svalbard Treaty in 
particular 
Article 31 VCLT is the basis: it provides that a ‘treaty shall be inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose’.37 I subscribe to ‘the primary necessity of interpreting an instru-
ment in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its 
conclusion’.38 What was the intention of the parties?
Jurisdiction is ‘den Grundsatz der Volkssouveränität’.39 Besides, 
the ‘doctrine of sovereignty in international law is superior to all oth-
ers’.40 Although some jurists affirm the demise of sovereignty, there is no 
evidence to support this. On the contrary, sovereignty ‘becomes greater 
every day’,41 ‘political and legal life’42 cannot survive without it. Whatever 
the realities of life, statehood and sovereignty remain ‘rock solid’ build-
ing blocks. Thus, in studying the ‘extended reach’ of the Svalbard Treaty, 
sovereignty is not at all in demise, but is rather the bedrock of interna-
tional law.
A point of departure is that the Svalbard Treaty concept of sovereign-
ty should be interpreted within the framework of the 1920s. At the end 
of WWI, new theories gained traction43 over Austin’s static sovereignty 
36  Island of Palmas (n 27) 869. 
37 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) ICJ Rep, 1991, 70: ‘These 
principles are reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, which may in many respects be considered as a codification of existing customary 
international law’.
38 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester Univer-
sity Press 1984) 139–140.
39 Hans Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokatie (Tübringen 1929) 32.
40 Sephan Hobe and Karsten Nowrot, ‘Whither the Sovereign State?’ (2007) 50 German 
Yearbook of International Law 243.
41 Wolfgang Friedman, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University 
Press 1964) 35.
42 Ian Brownlie (ed), Basic Documents on Human Rights (Clarendon Press 1971) 1.
43 Butler (n 1).
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concept,44 ideas that however arrived too late to influence the Svalbard 
Treaty. Thus, the theoretical background contradicts the belief that sig-
natories subscribed to an evolutionary interpretative style. My working 
hypothesis is that historic language reigns here (see part 2), which means 
ordinary meaning in the late 1910s. 
Some jurists consider Svalbard a sui generis territory ‘subject to a 
special international legal regime’.45 Presumably, this results from the 
oddity of its treaty-based jurisdiction, as opposed to the original jurisdic-
tion acquired by occupation. 
Professor Fleischer – former legal advisor to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs – objects: ‘The argument that the Svalbard Treaty establishes a 
particular regime of a generally limited jurisdiction is baseless’.46 I follow 
Fleischer. 
The right to regulate economic activity is unlimited under the clear 
language of the Treaty, provided that Norway grants foreigners equal 
rights to Norwegian nationals: ‘applicable equally to the nationals of all 
the High Contracting Parties without any exemption’ (article 2).  Simi-
larly, article 3: ‘[e]qual liberty of access and entry … to the waters, fjords 
and ports of the territories specified in article 1’. Article 3 repeats simi-
lar requirements (’equality’), article 7 (‘complete equality’) and article 4 
(‘absolute equality’). It is undisputed that Norway’s non-discriminatory 
regulatory power jurisdictione ratione personae does not and cannot lead 
to the conclusion that Norway’s jurisdiction is any less exclusive. Limited 
is not a synonym of shared. 
Confusing jurisdictional rights with economic rights has engendered 
a misperception concerning Svalbard’s alleged ‘particular regime’. It is 
erroneous to say that Norway enjoys limited sovereignty. According to ar-
ticle 1 of the Treaty, it is the recognition of Norway’s sovereignty, and not 
‘the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway’ as such, which is ‘subject to 
the stipulations of the present Treaty’.
The Treaty merely represents restrictions in specified legislative 
competences materially speaking, the most important being the require-
ment of non-discrimination.47
The ban on the discriminatory regulation of economic activities is an 
obligation of international law regarding the material content of legislation 
44 John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence (vols  I and VI, John Murray 1879).
45 Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘The Disputed Maritime Zones Around Svalbard’  in 
WE Butler (ed), Changes in the Artic Environment and the Law of the Sea (Panel IX, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2010) 565.
46 CA Fleischer, Petroleumsrett [Petroleum Law] (Universitetsforlaget 1983) 225; see also 
Ulfstein (n 8) 128.
47 Ulfstein (n 8) 128. See also page 436 ‘terra nullius non-discriminatory economic rights’.
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passed by Norway. Thus, discriminatory legislation would be in breach 
of the application of the Treaty, but not in breach of its jurisdictional 
powers. Thus, it limits Norway’s legislative capacity. It neither alters nor 
reduces it, however. Norway has duly and legally enacted all the statutes 
governing the entire territory defined in the Treaty.
Why is the limited sovereignty argument implausible? The answer 
can be provided thus: ‘[the] claim that Svalbard is ruled by a particular 
regime needs a foundation. Such a foundation does not exist. The Sval-
bard Treaty clearly states the opposite, namely that Norway enjoys “full 
and absolute sovereignty”’.48 I agree, as documented below.
The next analysis is based on the treaty ipso jure and ipso facto. 
Under article 77(3) LOSC, ‘[t]he rights of the coastal State over the con-
tinental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on 
any express proclamation’. I agree that under ‘international law a state’s 
territory automatically generates a continental shelf: it is not necessary 
for a state expressly to claim a continental shelf’.49 Therefore, Norway 
benefits directly from the changes to LOSC, no differently from Russia, 
for example, with regard to its unilaterally annexed Franz Joseph Land.
Norway, like other sovereign states, enjoys residual rights to the 
remaining competences not limited by the responsibilities that Norway 
owes to the international society of states. In accordance with article 1, it 
is only the implementation of sovereignty that is subject to certain stipu-
lations under the treaty.
While Norway is a sovereign, and not a custodial state or one holding 
a mandate, not all the treaty terms are beyond dispute. Take the term 
‘full’, for example. Article 1 of the treaty recognises the ‘full and absolute’ 
sovereignty of Norway over the Svalbard Box. Critics interpret ‘full’ to 
mean ‘limited sovereignty’ 50 or ‘semi-sovereignty’. 51 Others construe ‘full’ 
to mean ‘full and absolute’.52 The judicial competence of the Treaty suf-
fers from ratione materiae, personae, temporae and terrae limitations. 
1.7 The Svalbard Treaty restrains Norwegian statutes
Who possesses the competence to amend the Svalbard provisions on 
mining, trade, fishing and other harvesting activities? Is Norway’s assign-
ment unilateral? 
The treaty text provides no one with either supervisory, review or 
amendment powers. Hence, since the contracting parties failed to agree 
48 Fleischer (n 46) 224.
49 Churchill and Ulfstein (n 45) 561.
50 Ulfstein (n 8) 123.
51 Anderson (n 8) 15.
52 Fleischer (n 46) 224.
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to any particular framework constraining Norway’s legislative compe-
tence, domestic Norwegian legislation53 is the valid instrument to handle 
changing situations. 
Of course, limitations exist. Still, like everything else under the aus-
pices of a treaty, disputes are subject to negotiations, arbitral awards 
or court decisions. Accordingly, the treaty does not support any states 
parties’ claims to review Norway’s domestic legislation or to provide them 
with mechanisms for doing so. 
1.7.1 The right to legislate. The treaty framework 
Parties to the treaty acknowledge ‘the full and absolute sovereignty 
of Norway over the Archipelago of Spitsbergen’ (article 1). The sovereign is 
the legislator. Jurisdiction and sovereignty are inseparable. Jurisdiction-
al rights consist of three pillars: legislative, surveillance or enforcement, 
and dispute settlement rights. Norway indisputably enjoys jurisdictional 
rights in the Svalbard Box.
Article 2 concerns legislative competence. ‘Norway shall be free to 
maintain, take or decree suitable measures’. Nationals of the High Con-
tracting Parties in Svalbard enjoy hunting rights ‘under conditions laid 
down by the local police regulations… [and] subject always  to the obser-
vance of regulations made by the Norwegian Government’. This includes 
the right to set forth conditions for trade, mining, wildlife, and admin-
istrative tasks, for example. There are no restrictions on these rights. If 
Norway decides to regulate or ban a specific task, say by establishing a 
wildlife reserve like the one on Hopen,54 it can. No signatory or conven-
tional party may interfere with that decision. The treaty does not restrict 
amendments nor does it set forth institutionalised procedures to report 
or confirm any.
However, the legislative power of Norway regarding subjects’ right 
to engage in economic activity – to extract coal, fish, etc – is restricted. 
Norwegians cannot claim priority. On the contrary. All subjects of Treaty 
parties, regardless of nationality, place of registration, principal place 
of business, etc, enjoy equal harvesting and trading rights. In this re-
spect, Norway’s legislative power is limited. Still, within the harvesting 
and trade sector, Norway enjoys exclusive law-making autonomy, and 
power of surveillance and enforcement. It is up to Norway to draft tax 
statutes. Tax collected under the mining regime must serve the Svalbard 
53 See the Svalbard Act of 17 July 1925 § 1: ‘Svalbard is a part of the Kingdom of Norway’; 
the Statute of 3 June 1977 on the 200 nautical miles’ Fisheries Protection Zone at Sval-
bard; the Act of 17 December 1976 on the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone; and the 
continental shelf by Norwegian Decree in 1963. Cf the Act on Exploration and Exploitation 
of Sub-sea Natural Resources of 21 June 1963.
54 Rt 2008, 1747 Northlight Oil AS and Plexus Investments USA, Inc.
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community: ‘Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted exclusively to 
the said territories and shall not exceed what is required for the object in 
view’ (article 8.2).
With regard to policing, surveillance, control and enforcement, Norway 
enjoys exclusive autonomy of authority. As made clear in paragraph 9 of 
Annex 1 and paragraph 1 of Annex 2, Norway enjoys enforcement power 
‘in accordance with the laws and regulations in force or to be enforced 
in the territories specified in Article 1 of the present Treaty’. An illustra-
tion is § 29 of the Regulation concerning the Management of Wildlife in 
Svalbard of 24 May 1996: ‘The Governor is responsible for seeing to it 
that the provisions are complied with, and can, in that connection, issue 
more detailed provisions concerning control and supervision of hunting 
activities’.55
The Treaty does not restrict this jurisdiction. Thus, the right to over-
see and enforce all enacted laws and regulations complements the right 
to legislate as outlined in article 1. Norway’s ongoing enforcement prac-
tice on land has continued without objections. Offshore, in the FPZ, frus-
tration is more common. The Norwegian Supreme Court fisheries cases 
of 1996, 2001 and 2006 demonstrate this.56
In addition, dispute settlement belongs to Norwegian courts. The Act 
of 17 July 1925 relating to Svalbard proclaims that legal courts are those 
which the King determines (§§ 6 and 7). The King’s Resolution of 9 Octo-
ber 1925 applies this power.57  
This system has worked well for a long time. The contracting parties, 
with few official protests, tacitly acknowledge this.58 Thus, as is explicitly 
stated, Norway’s sovereignty is not conditional and does not differ from 
the sovereignty of other nation states.  It is unrestricted with regard to 
the process of legal decision making.
1.7.2 Economic rights – material limitations
Rights to exploitation, harvesting and other traditional activities on 
Svalbard are open to all citizens of the member states of the Treaty on an 
equal basis. Guarantees of non-discrimination of member states’ citizens 
conducting economic activity appear throughout the Treaty. ‘These meas-
ures shall always be applicable equally to the nationals of all the High 
55 Repealed by 1 July 2002.
56 Rt 1996, 624 (Iceland), Rt. 2001, 1172 (Russia and Great Britain) and Rt. 2006, 1498 
(Spain).
57 Kgl res of 8 March 1985 on the Svalbard judicial jurisdiction subsequently replaced it.
58 My study of the dossier of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Public Record Office dur-
ing the period 1917-1936 found only a few notes or aide memoires expressing disagreement 
or protests.
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Contracting Parties without any exemption’ (article 2). ‘The nationals of 
all the High Contracting Parties shall have equal liberty of access and 
entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports 
of the territories specified in Article 1’ (article 3). At other points in the 
Treaty text, the concepts of ‘complete equality’ (article 7) and ‘absolute 
equality’ (articles 3 and 4) are all guaranteed. It is commonly understood 
that beyond the particular issues barring discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, Norway enjoys unlimited jurisdiction.59
The Treaty’s parties are nation states, and not their citizens. Having 
no standing, the citizens of a contracting party cannot raise an issue be-
fore the ICJ alleging that Norway is breaching its treaty obligations. ‘Oth-
er nation states are the beneficiaries of an international law requirement 
that Norway treat those states’ citizens and companies in accordance 
with the Treaty requirements’.60 Thus, natural persons and legal persons 
such as business entities must seek recourse to their nation state.
The French position holds that ‘the citizens of all the Signatories 
will have the same fishing and hunting rights … This is an important 
limitation on sovereignty which should erase all doubts on approving the 
treaty, if any remain’.61 While the French language does not explicitly re-
serve non-discriminatory benefits to subjects already possessing lands, 
exploiting natural resources or conducting trade or industries in Sval-
bard, the reference to contracting parties’ citizens refers to the present 
inhabitants and not persons in spe. Nonetheless, the French parliament 
explicitly limits the benefit to the areas within the territorial sea. In the 
case of more extensive geographic ambitions, the claimants’ duty was to 
clarify them.
The US position is as follows:
The treaty …offers a satisfactory and a practical solution of the 
long-standing and vexatious questions relating to the sovereignty of 
the archipelago… It appears to be desirable that the United States 
should acquiesce in an arrangement to recognize the sovereignty of 
Norway over Spitzbergen. 62 
59 Ulfstein (n 8) 265-67.
60 NOU 1990:10 Ny lov om skatt til Svalbard [A New Tax Code for Svalbard]. Other member 
states benefit from an international legal right to see that their subjects are treated accord-
ing to the treaty.
61 Chambre des Députés, Session de 1924: Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des 
Affaires Etrangères. Chargée d’examiner le Projet de Loi Portant approbation de traité rela-
tive au Spitzberg, signé à Paris le 9 février 1920, 16. Citation taken from the Archive of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD jnr 20970/1924) in the Norway National Archive, 
Box JD, Dc-0084.
62 Congressional Record, vol 65, 18 February 1924 no 51, 2651 (Senate).
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In a communique to the Norwegian government, the US stated that 
‘[the] Government of the United States of America is in full accord with 
that of Great Britain in that it has no political interest in Spitzbergen’.63
Non-signatories like Germany supported the Norwegian position: 
[the] German Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs recognizes the Nor-
wegian position and will not oppose it if the Entente accepts it dur-
ing the Paris Peace Conference provided that German economic in-
terests are guaranteed.64 
The verb ‘to be’ is in the present tense.  Germany did not use “will be” 
to indicate guaranteed economic interests forever. Germany could just 
as easily have stated, ‘provided that German economic interests are and 
will be guaranteed’. It did not. Again, the foreign concern is to protect the 
present foreign citizens’ present economic rights.65
Only citizens’ ‘then existing’ enjoy equal rights protection. Thus, 
since none of the treaty parties were engaged in deep-sea mining, oil 
drilling, or high-seas fishing in 1920, none of these new activities enjoy 
protection.  In the same way, marine areas beyond the territorial waters 
of Svalbard are excluded from the treaty.66 
2 The Svalbard Treaty
2.1 Full and absolute sovereignty: a special regime
‘the evolution and development of the law can be taken into 
account in interpreting … such general terms as to lend them-
selves to an evolutionary interpretation … [T]his must always 
be on condition that such an evolutionary interpretation does 
not conflict with the intentions and expectations of the par-
ties as they may have been expressed during the negotiations 
preceding the conclusion of the treaty’.
Ian Sinclair67
63 Promemoria JD Jnr 110/1925: Dr juris Arnold Ræstad; Staten og den ikke-okkuperte 
grunn på Svalbard [The Government and the Non-occupied Ground in Svalbard] (13 Sep-
tember 1924) 23.
64 The Norway National Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Box 6166A. P1- settlement of 
international disputes L, League of Nations, XII, International Agencies, P2 War and Neu-
trality: Code-telegram (No 202) 26 April 1919, from the Norwegian Legacy in Berlin to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
65 As confirmed by the Norwegian Supreme Court, in the ‘Fischfang’ case Rt 2014, 272.
66 Ulfstein (n 8) 441.
67 Sinclair (n 26) 140. 
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The basic issue is the significance of Norwegian sovereignty over 
Svalbard. What is the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘full and absolute’? 
Does the first concept cover all issues of legal and economic rights, ie ju-
risdiction as well as harvesting rights, and does the latter notion denote 
‘unlimited and exclusive’?
Since most researchers reject terra nullius, or mandate and custodial 
pacts under the auspices of Norway, and since it is unnecessary to state 
the obvious, this part of the paper shows whether Svalbard is a special 
sovereignty system solely, as maintained by opponents to the Norwegian 
position: ‘Norway’s sovereignty over the territories …went hand in hand 
with a special regime (un régime équitable propre …)’.68  Thus, what is so 
special about Norway in executing its sovereignty?  
The focus of this section is whether the treaty establishes a peculiar 
type of sovereignty and, if not, whether the concept of ‘full and abso-
lute sovereignty’ is ‘evolutionary’ or ‘historic’. Another issue of interest is 
whether transfer of sovereignty is a ‘one-time thing’, or in need of con-
tinuous confirmation. I further ask whether this ‘peculiar type’ to which 
several researchers subscribe trumps jurisdictional rights pursuant to 
some other basic legal sources such as customary or general principles 
of law. This raises the question about whether Norwegian sovereignty is 
nothing but a special or a mutatis mutandis regime.
As stated, Norway enjoys ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ over the ar-
chipelago. There is no limitation to Norway’s sovereignty in this. This 
position is made even more vibrant in the French text. As interpretation 
shows, the signatories in the French version of the treaty express that 
they ‘sont d’accord pour reconnaître’ [‘agree to recognise’] Norwegian sov-
ereignty (see article 10). Thus, sovereignty – the existence of which Nor-
way claimed ex tunc – was acknowledged by the signatories by ratification 
of the 1920 Treaty. There is no review or withdrawal mechanism. This 
clarifies that the transfer of jurisdiction was a one-time thing.
By 14 August 1925 all signatories had assented to Norway’s exclu-
sive autonomy over Svalbard. The ratifications were unconditional, cf ‘ni 
condition ni reserve’. No one claimed any time limitations or other modifi-
cations to the Norwegian jurisdiction. Thus, the treaty was concluded for 
unlimited duration.
No form of condominium was ever recommended. Neither was any 
later recurring ratification of the sovereignty nor of any permanent sys-
tem of recognition of domestic Norwegian legislation regarding the Sval-
bard population or businesses.
Clearly, it is easily conceived that the treaty text recognised by 
the parties invariably expresses the irrevocable sovereignty of Norway. 
68 Anderson (n 7) 2. 
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Norwegian policy claims absolute sovereignty rule over the archipelago.69 
Consequently, Norway insists that the Treaty terms set forth a territorial 
framework, not only for 1920 but also for all time: Norway’s sovereignty 
in the Svalbard Box is irrevocable.
The treaty’s founding fathers used conventional language – ie ‘the 
ordinary meaning’ of words. I cannot conclude but that ‘full and abso-
lute sovereignty’ is a generic utterance. It contains – for the time being 
– acknowledged competences as framed by international law. Norway, 
like other coastal states, enjoys residual rights (see part 1.4) which are 
limited by acknowledged international laws solely. The treaty text inserts 
neither a special nor a mutatis mutandis regime.
2.2 ‘Territorial waters’: the geographic scope 
‘That would be a strange result: in the law of the 
sea, rights diminish, not increase, as one moves 
outwards from the coast’.70 
The focus here is twofold:  first, to investigate entitlements for a ter-
restrial extension of the Svalbard Treaty. Second, to compare the alleged 
Norway restrictions beyond the territorial sea with the US extension of 
the three-nautical-mile zone of exclusive harvesting rights that the sev-
eral states or their inhabitants hold.
My hypothesis is that divergent views on the Treaty’s ‘geographic 
scope’ result from the following: first, controversies regarding the un-
derlying presumption. Critics (also called opponents in this paper) re-
fuse to recognise residual rights as a platform for all reasoning regarding 
sovereign state jurisdiction. Second, they refuse to relate the disputed 
‘geographic scope’ to the correct legal basis. The geographic scope of the 
Treaty is clearly set out in the Treaty. The lack of mention of marine areas 
beyond the territorial waters is obvious, as the conclusion of the Treaty 
precedes even the vaguest forecast on the developments of the present 
law of the sea. This being the case, the question is what the legal basis is 
for the establishment of the Svalbard FPZ, and if there is some other legal 
basis for arguing that the Svalbard Treaty provisions apply even beyond 
the geographic scope of the Treaty. Third, critics confuse jurisdictional 
rights with economic rights, ie the ‘right of other nations in mining and 
69 On Norway’s position, see Rolf Fife, ‘Svalbard and the Surrounding Maritime Areas: 
Background and Legal Issues – Frequently Asked Questions’ <www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/
ud/selected-topics/civil--rights/spesiell-folkeett/folkerettslige-sporsmal-i-tilknytning-ti.
html?id=537481> accessed 16 May 2014. For a supportive position, see also Fleischer (n 
46) 295ff. 
70 Anderson (n 7) 15.
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trade’,71 that is, the nationals of the Parties. Fourth, critics wrongly claim 
that the Svalbard Treaty – in general – should be interpreted according to 
a dynamic evolutionary reading or analogy.   
Thus, the salient point is whether the Svalbard Treaty suffers from 
lenient textual interpretation and too shallow investigations which collide 
with the intentions of the signatories to the treaty.
The Treaty’s terrestrial scope is clear cut, ie the Svalbard Box (article 
1). No text approves of Norwegian jurisdiction beyond the Box. Neither 
does practice as revealed in part 1. Since treaty law does not resolve the 
issue of geographic scope, Norwegian powers with regard to the marine 
areas beyond the territorial waters of Svalbard result from customary or 
general principles of law, and not treaty law.
The treaty refrains from stipulating whether Norway could, accord-
ing to the Treaty text, enjoy exclusive control over areas beyond the Sval-
bard Box. Thus, Norway’s offshore entitlements must result from general 
legal development, and not from the Treaty itself:
Consonantly with the wording of art. 1 of the Svalbard Treaty… 
Norway was granted an ordinary sovereignty, i.e. similar to territo-
rial sovereignty based on customary international law. This means 
that in principle the rights of other states under the Svalbard Treaty 
should be determined as if Norway had granted [them] such rights 
as a territorial sovereign.72
My position is that there is a legal solution to the Treaty’s disputed 
‘geographic scope’. Do Svalbard ‘territorial waters’ really cover not only 
the EEZ but also the continental shelf? The challenge is to determine the 
relevant sources of law. As the Treaty text is inadequate, customary or 
general principles of law apply. Due to this very fact, one simply cannot 
subscribe to a position of the description of the geographic delimitation 
as a generic-referring expression with a referent assumed to be alterable. 
2.3 The treaty text contribution and preparatory work
With the advantage of hindsight, states parties advancing arguments 
about ratione terrae would have presented their views to the plenipoten-
tiaries before signing the Treaty. However, at the present time, views on 
the Treaty’s possibly extended geographic scope appear as de scententia 
ferenda.
Examining geographic reach, the ‘travail préparatoire’ is a vital in-
terpretative factor. The trilateral draft convention (Norway, Russia and 
71 As already clarified in 1927: Chambers’s Encyclopædia. A Dictionary of Universal Knowl-
edge (W & R Chambers 1927) 604.
72 Ulfstein (n 8) 469.
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Sweden)73 proposed an 8 nautical mile territorial sea, leaving no discre-
tionary power to Norway.  Norway had a duty to comply. In this case, if 
the 8 nautical miles had become the final result, even more outcomes 
would have followed from this very fact. I here fully subscribe to the 
Linderfalk position to the dispute settlement in the delimitation case be-
tween the United Kingdom and Germany:74 ‘After all, the whole point of 
entering into a boundary agreement is to establish once and for all the 
location of a common boundary’.75 
However, the 8 nautical miles limit never became the end result. The 
Dutch government referred to the proposed limit as a ‘slip of the pen’.76 
There was no mistake, however. Instead, the 8-mile compromise was 
a half-way solution between the 12-mile zone sought by the Soviets and 
the 4-mile Norway zone.77 However, at the second Trilateral Treaty Con-
ference, Great Britain78 and France79 objected to the 8-mile rule. Thus, 
the parties failed to reach agreement on geographic reach.  As a result, 
the Signatories assigned and entrusted to Norway the right to decide the 
issue. This is confirmed by subsequent practice: Norway, to no opposi-
tion, unilaterally established its straight baselines, fixed its territorial sea 
at 4 nautical miles, and in 2006, expanded it to 12 nautical miles. Thus, 
the international society of states acknowledged that the width of the ter-
ritorial sea falls fully under the unilateral decision of Norway.
How to solve the geographic scope? The historical background gives 
us a clue. In the mid and late 1920s, several international conferences 
took place to finalise the disputed issues of the reach of the archipelagic 
waters in general. Since – as proposed – the archipelago could foster 
‘straight baselines’, some of which extended to twice the breath of an or-
dinary territorial sea, the absence of any discussion on the matter seems 
to indicate that the Paris Peace Treaty conference on Svalbard declined 
to grant to Norway any exact stipulation of the archipelagic sea that, ac-
cording to the law of the sea, was not clearly defined at that time.80 While 
73 Mathisen (n 15) 113ff.
74 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Re-
ports, 1999(II) 1045ff.
75 Ulf Linderfalk, ‘On the Understanding of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Ex-
pressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (Law and Philosophy Library 
83, Springer 2007)  91 (emphasis added).
76 Mathisen (n 15) 113ff.
77 ibid, 128.
78 ibid, 133.
79  ibid, 135, fn 5.
80 CF Amerasinghe, ‘The Problem of Archipelagoes in the International Law of the Sea’ 
(1974) 23 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 539, 541-43, referring to confer-
ences, ie (1926) 20 AJIL Spec Suppl 318, 319; (1928) 34 Annuaire de I’lnstitut de droil inter-
national, 673; and (1929) 2 Series League of Nations 51.
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the parties refrained from stipulating the exact reach of the territorial 
sea, the signatories did not waive the latter well-recognised and more or 
less defined offshore area. The heavily disputed archipelagic water, on 
the other hand, remained unresolved. The same is true of possible future 
developments of the coastal states’ exclusive harvesting right on its con-
tinental shelf.81 The parties simply did not consider them.
Deciding on an EEZ was beyond the 1920 Treaty text. Hence, the 
founding parties delegated to Norway the power to decide whether to 
establish an EEZ, FPZ or simply to refrain from establishing any zone 
at all. While 200 nautical miles is the maximum allowed, Norway in its 
discretion may opt for less all-embracing zones. Few object to this, cf 
the establishment of an FPZ in 1977. The key issue then is whether the 
treaty limitations on Norwegian sovereignty pertain to these waters and 
the continental shelf. Again, the answer to this issue depends on whether 
customary law and general principles of law distinguish between differ-
ent ways of territorial acquisition regarding sovereignty once obtained, ie 
whether sovereignty is acquired through original treaty-based occupation 
or annexation. 
2.4 Methodical issues: the Vienna Convention 
How to interpret the 1920 Svalbard Treaty jurisdictione ratione ter-
rae? While the ‘territorial sea’ extension was not fully determined in in-
ternational law, the contiguous zone belonged to the future. While an 
expansion from 3 nautical miles to 8 or even 12, territorial sea was not 
contradictory to ‘the ordinary meaning’ of ‘territorial waters’, quite an-
other type of jurisdiction occurred with the launch of the EEZ. The intro-
duction of the innovative law of the sea exclusive harvesting zone of 200 
nautical miles and a ‘continental shelf’ had been impossible to predict.
Thus, whether the ‘restrictive approach’ is ‘old-fashioned’ is irrel-
evant because the Treaty is a WWI product. The 1920 Treaty has not 
hampered unilateral Norwegian decisions on the reach of the territorial 
waters. Clearly, the ‘territorial sea’ of Svalbard has ‘evolved’ from 4 nauti-
cal miles to 12 nautical miles in accordance with the development of the 
law of the sea.  ‘Territorial waters’ is a distinct concept which can never 
‘enhance’ or be interpreted dynamically to include other types of marine 
areas like fisheries zones, marine protection zones, exclusive economic 
zones, etc, unless it is made evident that the parties intended to devi-
ate from the ordinary meaning of the term ‘territorial waters’. As is well 
known, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas refrained from 
acknowledging South American claims to an inflated national zone up to 
81 Cecil Hurst, ‘Whose is the Bed of the Sea’ (1923) 34 British Yearbook of International 
Law. 
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250 nautical miles from the baselines. It was in the early 1970s that the 
exclusive economic zone was first introduced.
Since ‘territorial’ water used in the Svalbard Treaty is a ‘generic 
term’,  describing a jurisdictional system of complete coastal state auton-
omy with the exception of ‘innocent passage’, the concept cannot ‘evolve’ 
over time to include marine areas beyond the LOSC 12 nautical miles 
maximum territorial waters embracing the jurisdictional power of quite 
another type than the first. Thus, treaty terms should be read in the light 
of their ordinary historical meaning at the time of the treaty making. Ap-
plying evolutionary concepts turns the 1920 meaning upside down, be-
cause these concepts are based on legal requirements adopted long after 
the drafting of the treaty.
‘Evolutionary concepts’ are not flawed or without basis in law.  Not 
at all.  They are viable and interpretative methods in cases where parties 
affirmatively indicate that some treaty terms are subject to ‘dynamic in-
terpretation’ if that is their intention. In the case of Svalbard, this is the 
pertinent illustration: ‘territorial sea’ is, substantially speaking, static. 
When it comes to ‘geographic reach’, the treaty should be interpreted in 
the light of the development of international law, and is thus dynamic.  
Such interpretation will then replace the default legal standard – 
the ‘contemporaneity principle’ – and become the legal standard set by 
the living fabric of life,82 or ‘changing social needs’.83 The question here, 
therefore, is whether the Svalbard Treaty text demonstrates an intended 
special meaning of the Treaty’s geographic reach.
If the Treaty text and travaux préparatoires fail to solve the matter, 
customary and general principles of law are a subordinate source of law 
that can come to the rescue (ICJ statute, article 38.1). Since there is no 
evidence to show otherwise, the parties to the Svalbard Treaty have left 
lacunae to be resolved by customary and general principles of law.
Case law and the writings of distinguished jurists are the very last 
resort to repair loopholes left by conventional, customary, or general 
principles of law (ICJ statute, article 38(1)d). 
Consequently, the ‘logical’84 or ‘natural’85 view on the validity of the 
terrestrial scope of the Treaty are not the decisive arguments, as some 
jurist have presumed.
82 Brad Snyder, ‘The House that Built Holmes’ (2012) 30(3) Law & History Review 661, 706. 
The author presents this famous statement of the US Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in its historical context. 
83 Ulfstein (n 8) 87.
84 Anderson (n 7).
85 Ulfstein (n 8) 125, 127, 140, 366, 411, 424, 429, 479.
75CYELP 13 [2017] 53-86
Treaty parties may – if it is documented that parties intended to give 
a special meaning to a term – subscribe to a particular interpretative 
method (article 31.4 VCLT), one that differs from the method used when 
applying general principles of law expressed in the ICJ Statute. The issue 
in casu is whether the 1920 Treaty provides for particular interpretative 
methods set forth by the signatory states. The answer is no. There are no 
treaty provisions that contradict general interpretation principles as set 
forth in the VCLT. Thus, these codified customary law principles in the 
VCLT apply to the Svalbard Treaty.
2.5 An interpretative approach  
‘[In] the law of treaties … the intention of the parties is re-
ally the key … [a] wider principle – intention of the parties 
reflected by reference to object and purpose – that guides 
the law of treaties’.
Rosalyn Higgins86
The issue for discussion is whether the Svalbard Treaty text imposes 
inter-temporal reading: 
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instru-
ment in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of 
its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account the fact that 
the concepts … ‘the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ and 
‘the well-being and development’ of the peoples concerned – were not 
static, but were by definition evolutionary.87
We need to consider how the interpretative style contributes to the 
understanding of a possible geographic scope of the Svalbard Treaty. In 
this part, I return to the discussion begun in part 1.3 on the evolutionary 
reading of texts.
How to interpret the treaty text concerning the ratione terrae 
inquiry?88 The contracting parties control not only the substantive pro-
visions of the treaty, but also the method of interpreting it. As demon-
strated, the ‘contemporaneity principle’ is the legal standard for treaty 
interpretation.
86 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law’ 
in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed), Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Brill 1996).
87 Legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion of 21 June 1971 ICJ Reports 1971 § 53.
88 For a general and comprehensive study, see eg ES Yambrusic, Treaty Interpretation—
Theory and Reality (University Press of America 1986).
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A criticism of the Norwegian position regarding the geographic scope 
of the Treaty is that the ‘Norwegian government’s argument ignores the 
second [Treaty context] and third [the Treaty’s object and purpose] of 
those elements’ prescribed in the interpretative rules in article 31(1) 
VCLT.89 Alas, these critics do not give reasons for their position.
Undoubtedly, the judge’s basic task is to search for ‘[the parties’] 
intention as expressed in the words used by them in the light of the sur-
rounding circumstances’.90 It is possible that the parties to any treaty 
express no particular intention in its text with regard to the issue in 
question. Here, that issue is the geographic scope of the Svalbard Treaty, 
a topic never addressed by the contracting parties.  Where the parties ex-
press no intent, you cannot deduce one from the treaty language: neither 
from its context, nor from its object or purpose.
Alternatively, as the Norwegian government has clearly put forth, 
one has reason to believe that the signatories’ disinterest in the future 
legal or political development indicates that the societies of states in 1920 
had no intention of blocking or barring Norway from reaping the benefits 
of the new developments of international law.
Accession is one thing, and amendment procedures are another. 
Amending the treaty’s territorial frame entails consensus. In the words 
of Fleischer:    
The islands and territorial sea located within 4 nautical miles out-
side of the straight baselines are Norwegian.  … All coastal states 
seem to support the law introducing an economic zone of 200 miles, 
which includes their entire coastlines. Thus, the existence of a zone 
that covers the entire Spitsbergen is based upon a legal principle like 
that of the zone surrounding continental Norway.91 
Thus, the official Norway position is that the legal basis for Svalbard 
FPZ is nothing other than the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), 
in effect since 16 November 1996.92 Since coastal states may establish 
‘more’, ie EEZ, it may do what is ‘less’, ie EFZ or EPZ.
The opponents of Norway’s position on the limited geographic scope 
of the Treaty reject that Norway possesses either a national continental 
shelf or an exclusive economic zone beyond the Svalbard territorial sea.93 
89 Churchill and Ulfstein (n 45) 567.
90 AD McNair, The Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Oxford 1961) 365.
91 CA Fleischer, ‘Le Régime d’exploitation de Spitsberg (Svalbard)’ (1978) 24 Annuaire 
Français de Droit International 295-297.
92 The United Nations Convention of 10 December 1982 on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS, 
21 ILM 1262 (1982).
93 Ulfstein (n 8) 440-41; Anderson (n 7) 14-15.
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The significance of the opponents’ position relies on treaty interpre-
tation, ie the literal meaning of the words and terms expressed in the 
Treaty, as understood by the interpreters’ consideration of what is ‘natu-
ral’ 94 or ‘logical’. 95 This results from the de lege lata analysis and makes 
amendment procedures unnecessary.
However, neither ‘logical’ nor ‘natural’ applications are valid inter-
pretative factors under article 31 VCLT or sources of international law 
according to article 38 of the ICJ Statute. On the contrary, logical and 
natural application are, as a matter of legal sources, ranked inferior to 
text, context, traveaux préparatoires, the parties’ intentions, and custom-
ary or general principles of law. 
Of course ‘logical’ or ‘natural’ application may qualify as de senten-
tial ferenda statements. However, although these applications express 
nothing more than the 21st century interests of the parties advancing 
them, they still do not apply here.
Which circumstances or privileges caused the contracting states 
parties to set aside their unanimous, strictly literal, textual and contex-
tual interpretation of their own provisions and to adopt the interpreta-
tion they now champion? This newly proposed understanding is an ‘un-
leashed’, unassigned de sentential ferenda legislative approach. It argues 
for an unlimited geographic reach – somehow – even though the clear 
treaty language provides just the opposite. The old contracting parties 
have a name for their brand-new interpretative approach called ‘dynamic 
interpretation’.96 It is claimed that the solution ‘must depend on a con-
crete assessment of the question under interpretation’,97 in the light of 
the current situation.
As the text and context indicate, the equitable regime relates to 
economic access prohibiting nationality-based legal discrimination and 
guaranteeing equal rights to harvest and trade in the treaty area. The 
main purpose of the signatories was to protect: (i) the present economic 
rights of subjects of nation states, where present means at treaty-making 
time; and (ii) the status quo. The Treaty sought to guarantee existing 
rights and not to allocate potential new rights to these subjects. The ‘eq-
uitable regime’ relates and refers to going concerns. 
The Treaty includes no signs of evolutionary concepts. If Norway 
obtained final sovereignty over Svalbard, which is Norway’s position,98 
94 Ulfstein  (n 8) 125, 127, 140, 366, 411, 424, 429, 479.
95 Anderson (n 7).
96 Ulfstein (n 8) 89.
97 ibid, 88.
98 St meld nr 39 (1974-75) Vedrørende Svalbard [On Svalbard] 7: By the Svalbard Treaty, 
Norway has finally retrieved sovereignty over Svalbard.
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no differently from the sovereignty obtained and claimed by other land-
masses around the globe, then the context is quite different, as is the 
reasonable interpretation.  
My interpretation of the same fact is the following: originally, the 
Spitsbergen Commission proposed a fixed territorial sea of 8 nautical 
miles. The end result was no specification at all: thus, Norway, the pos-
sessor of residual rights, enjoyed unilateral, domestic law competence 
with regard to the width of the territorial sea. Instead of determining the 
exact straight-line distance from the baseline for Norway to adjust to, the 
territorial sea was undetermined and thus Norway was left to decide it 
unilaterally – within the maximum limit of international law.
Because Norway held ‘full and absolute sovereignty’ (article 1), the 
signatories entrusted Norway with the ‘legal dynamics’. Once acquired, 
Svalbard is governed by the domestic law of the sovereign state of Nor-
way. Norway, like other coastal states, enjoys the rewards of the general 
development of the law of the sea.
Thus, recognition was a one-time thing. Consequently, one simply 
cannot subscribe to a position of the description of the geographic de-
limitation as a generic-referring expression with a referent assumed to 
be alterable. 
Visibly, it can be easily conceived that the treaty text recognised by 
the parties invariably expresses the irrevocable sovereignty of Norway. 
The Svalbard case is clearly not comparable with the arbitrational award 
in La Bretagne,99 characterising the concept of ‘fishery regulation’ as a 
non-generic legal standard. I thus subscribe to the Linderfalk position as 
referred to above.100 
2.6 Substantial issues: does case law give a clue? 
Judicial precedent is a valid source of law. What is the nature of the 
territorial sea and ‘nature of the continental shelf as a territorial exten-
sion’? Do these arguments apply directly to the issue of the geographic 
scope of the treaty?  Are they instead only of slight relevance because the 
analogies are not to the point?  My primary interest is whether the facts of 
these cases – as claimed by some critics to the Norwegian position – cover 
instances that are analogous and thus relevant to the Svalbard Box. Sec-
ondly, this article seeks to determine whether case law is relevant to the 
Svalbard issue of geographic scope.
99 Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence (Canada/France), Award of 
17 July 1986, ILR vol 82, 591ff (hereinafter: the La Bretagne case).
100 Linderfalk (n 75) 91.
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One case referred to by critics of the Norway position is the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration in the Grisbadarna case (1909).101 At issue 
was the delimitation of a certain part of the maritime boundary between 
Norway and Sweden. Norway had transferred the county of Bohuslen to 
Sweden by treaty in 1661.  
The legal issue that parallels Svalbard was whether or how to give ef-
fect to the 1661 Bohuslen Treaty that guaranteed the continuous validity 
of ancient Norwegian (St Olav) laws.102 One basic principle of these laws 
was open access to the outer fisheries commons. The Svalbard Treaty 
parallel puzzle is whether the treaty that guaranteed all inhabitants of 
Bohuslen County previous rights for all time should also apply to waters 
beyond territorial waters due to the law of the sea (LOS) advances in the 
1970s.
At issue was how to construe the 1661 treaty term – to the limit of 
the territorial waters – in 1909. The treaty text directed the court in its 
detection of the maritime boundary line between the litigants Norway and 
Sweden. As a point of departure, the court determined ‘from the evidence’ 
that the parties had not intended ‘to fix in advance the terminal point of 
the boundary’. The court decided the case based on facts and interna-
tional law. 
Despite the opponents’ assertion, case law fails to support their rea-
sons on the terrestrial issue. Instead, they support Norway’s position on 
the Svalbard Box.
As for the non-binding dicta, what possible relevance can the Grisba-
darna case have when read in connection with the Aegean Sea Continen-
tal Shelf and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases? While the ‘continuous 
nature of the continental shelf as a territorial extension’ is stressed in the 
Aegean Sea case and in the North Sea case, the perspective of the Grisba-
darna case is different.103
As the award shows, the court rejected a possible intrinsic connec-
tion between the sea and the land territory and further rejected the al-
leged connection between the sea beyond the ancient borderline of 1661 
and the new one made in 1909. The court held that the marine territory 
‘presents numerous peculiarities which distinguish it from the land ter-
ritory’. Altogether, the contracting parties had not set the boundary from 
the land to the sea (‘territorial extension’). They had done just the oppo-
site. ‘In determining the boundary line’, the contracting parties had gone 
‘in a direction from the sea toward the coast.104  
101 The Grisbadarna case (Norway v Sweden) Hague Ct Rep (Perm Ct Arb 1909).
102 Knut Robberstad, Rettsoge bd I [Legal History, vol I] (Universitetsforlaget 1971) 231.
103 Grisbadarna (n 101) 128.
104 Grisbadarna (n 101) 128 (emphasis added).
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The next question is whether the Aegean105 or the North Sea case106 
can serve, as the critics of Norway claim, as precedents regarding the 
‘geographic scope’ of the Svalbard Treaty.
The 1969 North Sea case decided the delimitation of opposite and ad-
jacent territories of Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. The parties 
‘had asked the Court to declare the principles and rules of international 
law applicable to the delimitation’ of the North Sea continental shelf.107 
On the face of it, the facts of the cases are not at all similar, much less 
identical to the treaty facts. Nevertheless, in deciding the issue, the court 
may have considered customary or general law principles upon which 
maritime issues are regulated in a much broader sense.
The North Sea case, as it happens, is irrelevant for determining the 
Svalbard geographic scope. This case discusses the zone and shelf in the 
light of the ‘geographical configuration of the coastlines of the countries 
whose continental shelves are to be delimited’.108 The court’s position is 
that one cannot ignore the configuration of the coast because the shelf 
is ‘evocative of the land and not of the sea’.109 These remarks relate to 
the configuration of the land and thus the parallel delimitation offshore, 
meaning the borderline between opposite and adjacent states. As stated, 
‘the Court has examined the problems raised by the present case in its 
own context, which is strictly that of delimitation’.110 
Thus, the context of the Svalbard case is not remotely analogous. 
The North Sea case does not address substantive law governing the juris-
dictional powers of the coastal states within the EEZ or the continental 
shelf. 
The court’s ratio decidendi focuses on the importance of ‘natural 
prolongation’ of the countries’ seabed when resolving how to measure 
the shelf and establish delimitation lines towards opposite and adjacent 
coastlines. The court did not opine on the juridical or logical connection 
between the territorial waters and areas beyond. No alternative bases ex-
ist for a claim that this case should bind a decision regarding the Svalbard 
Treaty’s geographic scope. The issue of whether the parties’ mainland or 
islands could be precluded from the parties’ own choices regarding con-
tinuous zones or shelves beyond their territorial sea was not decided. 
The court’s obiter dictum offered some relevant and persuasive legal 
advice. The court addressed the topic of pragmatic, non-principle-based 
105 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, 3.
106 North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3.
107 ibid, paras 1-7.
108 ibid, paras 96, 51.
109 ibid.  
110 ibid, para 100 (emphasis added).
81CYELP 13 [2017] 53-86
solutions relevant also for the extensions of the treaty to areas beyond 
the territorial sea of the archipelago. The court warned against a move to 
‘over-systematize a pragmatic construct the developments of which have 
occurred within a relatively short space of time’.111 Factors such as ‘prac-
tical convenience and certainty of application’, the court held, ‘did not 
suffice’, without converting ‘what was a method into a rule of law’.  Even 
though the court hesitated to establish normative structures based on 
relatively scarce data, it did recognise the following single event as defin-
ing a new source of the LOS principle:
This régime furnishes an example of a legal theory derived from a 
particular source that has secured a general following. As the Court 
has recalled … it was the Truman Proclamation of 28 September 
1945 which was at the origin of the theory, whose special features 
reflect that origin.112 
Thus, the coastal state decides – unilaterally – whether to establish 
an EEZ or a claim involving the shelf, of course with the exception of 
delimitation line decisions that require bilateral agreements between ad-
jacent and opposite states. Perhaps this general principle of law applies 
to the possible geographic scope of the Svalbard Treaty. 
The Aegean Sea case113 is put forward to prove that the Aegean Trea-
ty is valid not only within but also beyond the territorial sea. Due to its 
concrete application, it is impossible to derive any rules from this case 
that govern or even shed light on the geographic scope of the treaty.
The Aegean case reveals the subsequent presumption that ‘the very 
idea of the continental shelf was wholly unknown in 1928 when the Gen-
eral Act was concluded and in 1931 when Greece acceded to the Act’.114 
Greece relied on the Abu Dhabi case to maintain that its reservation did 
not exclude claims involving the shelf.115 The Abu Dhabi arbitrator held 
that ‘the granting of a mineral oil concession in 1939 was not to be un-
derstood as including the continental shelf’. The court in the Aegean case 
declined, because of an ‘essential difference’, 116 to find any analogy.  
Further the court stated that issues raising substantive law are dif-
ferent from procedural law. 117 Compared to the Svalbard conflict, the 
international law claims for Norway not to discriminate against subjects 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid.
113 Aegean Sea (n 105) 21ff. 
114 ibid, para 77.
115 Petroleum Development Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, International Law Reports (1951) 144, 
152.
116 Aegean Sea (n 105) 32, para 77.
117 ibid.
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of the Treaty signatories fail to provide any limitation in relation to Nor-
wegian decision-making competences regarding the geographic reach in 
the Svalbard legislation.
As the exploitation rights in the Abu Dhabi case were not appropriate 
to resolve the court’s jurisdiction in the Aegean case, the court’s analysis 
of its lack of jurisdiction is of limited importance in solving the ‘extended-
puzzle’ of the Svalbard Treaty. The ICJ’s analysis paves the way for reach-
ing this conclusion.
Instead, my idea is that the Abu Dhabi case118 is relevant and dis-
positive. The salient point was who had the right to control ‘the seabed 
and subsoil of the Persian Gulf adjacent to the coast of Abu Dhabi’?119 
In 1939, Sheikh Shakhbut, the Sultan and Ruler of Abu Dhabi, had en-
tered into a contract with the Iraq Petroleum Development Company. 
Under its terms, the Sheikh ‘purported to transfer to Iraq Petroleum the 
exclusive right to drill for mineral oil within a certain area in Abu Dhabi’. 
Iraq Petroleum contended that the exclusive rights so granted included 
the territorial waters and the subsoil of the continental shelf.  Abu Dhabi 
denied this, claiming that the rights were limited to land, and that Abu 
Dhabi acted legally when leasing the waters and subsoil to another oil 
company in 1949. 
In deciding the dispute, the arbitrator framed the issues as follows. 
First, ‘at the time of the Agreement did [the Sheikh] own …the right to win 
mineral oil from the subsoil of any, and, if so, what sub-marine area lying 
outside territorial waters?’ Second, if this answer is in the positive, ‘was 
the effect of the Agreement to transfer such original or acquired rights 
to the Claimant Company?’120 ‘Directed as I apprehend I am’, the judge 
stated, ‘to apply a simple and broad jurisprudence to the construction of 
this contract, it seems to me that it would be a most artificial refinement 
to read back into the contract the implication of a doctrine [on Continen-
tal Shelf] not mooted till seven years later’.121
Hence, ex post facto legal events cannot re-define the legal position 
taken by contracting parties to an agreement signed many years before 
disputes arise thereunder. Examining the geographic scope of the Sval-
bard Treaty, general principles of law apply. The stepping stone for this 
conclusion is the fact that critics’ ratione terrae claims are utterly unsup-
ported by the Treaty itself. This means that we must solve the issue by 
looking to LOSC and customary and general principles of law. 
118 Reprinted in International and Comparative Law Quarterly (April 1952) 247.
119 Edwin J Cosford Jr, ‘The Continental Shelf and the Abu Dhabi Award’ (1953) 1 McGill 
Law Journal 109.
120 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 247 (1952) 248.
121 ibid 253.
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2.7 Comparable developments: US treaties with natives 
A possible comparison relevant for the critics’ position of Norway in 
the Svalbard Treaty’s ‘long-arm-reach puzzle’ is the United States’ acces-
sion treaties with Indian tribes and the terms on which new states like 
Texas and Alaska were admitted to the Union in the 1800s. The Indian 
tribes122 and inhabitants of Alaska, Texas,123 Hawaii124 and others kept 
their states’ rights after joining the Union. 
Inhabitants who benefited from exclusive territorial fishing rights 
determined under the terms of the treaties or other legal documents by 
which the states joined the Union gain no extended ‘coastal rights’ be-
yond the original belt,125 pursuant to LOSC development. The United 
States possess these rights. It is undisputed that evolving rights under 
LOSC accommodate the federal state, not individual ‘component’ states. 
The US solution parallels the Norway case. The Svalbard Treaty priv-
ileges within the territorial sea benefit the nationals of the parties. The 
terms of the Treaty set them forth. Change to the LOS, on the other hand, 
offers inhabitants no claim beyond the territorial sea. It is clear that those 
rights benefit the USA and not the citizens of the national states. 
2.8 Subsequent development: the significance of EEA provisions 
Subsequent development ‘regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions’ (article 31.3 VCLT) is a relevant in-
terpretative factor. What is its contribution to unraveling the Svalbard 
Treaty puzzle? 
As stated by the Vienna Convention, the parties’ subsequent express 
or tacit dispositions may contribute to the interpretation of a treaty. One 
such occurrence is the Norwegian accession to the EEA agreement of 2 
May 1992. What solutions to the ratione terrae puzzle derive from EEA 
accession?
Article 126 EEA codifies the treaty’s jurisdictione ratione terrae: ‘The 
Agreement shall apply to … the territories of Iceland, the Principality of 
Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway’. What do ‘the territories of … 
Norway’ signify? 
122 See Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, 1855. 25 June 1855 (12 Stats 963) Ratified 
8 March 1859 – Proclaimed 18 April 1859.
123 A Treaty of Annexation, concluded between the United States of America and the Repub-
lic of Texas 12 April 1844.
124 Treaty of Annexation between the Republic of Hawaii and the United States of America 
(1898).
125 For a theoretical approach, see Gary Lawson, ‘Territorial Governments and the Limits of 
Formalism’ (1990) 78 California Law Review 853, 853. 
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Svalbard is part of the Kingdom of Norway and incorporates under 
the EØS-concept ‘territories of … the Kingdom of Norway’.  However, Nor-
way may exempt the territory of Svalbard from the treaty’s application. 
EEA Protocol 40 states:
1. When ratifying the EEA Agreement, the Kingdom of Norway shall 
have the right to exempt the territory of Svalbard from the applica-
tion of the Agreement.
2. If the Kingdom of Norway avails itself of this right, existing agree-
ments applicable to Svalbard, i.a. the Convention establishing the 
European Free Trade Association, the Free Trade Agreement between 
the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway … 
shall continue to apply to the territory of Svalbard.
What solutions to the ratione terrae puzzle derive from accession to 
the EEA? First of all, the competence to decide whether the EEA applies 
to ‘the territory of Svalbard’ belongs to Norway. This includes, first, the 
unilateral use of this exemption and, second, the ultimate right to define 
what is the geographic reach of the concept of ‘territory’. Thus, the pos-
sible ‘long arm reach’ of the Svalbard Treaty is unilaterally to be decided 
by Norway. If neither the signatories of the EEA nor the Svalbard Treaty 
object, the Norway position is tacitly acknowledged and thus de facto 
recognised.
Secondly, the Norwegian act of EEA accession of 27 November 1992 
No 109, § 6 states: ‘This act does not apply to Svalbard’. Accordingly, Nor-
way exempted ‘the territory of Svalbard’. This provision does not, how-
ever, specify whether ‘Svalbard’ relates to the areas within the Svalbard 
Box only, or relates to areas beyond the Box or at least beyond the ter-
ritorial sea (Act on Norway’s Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone of 
27 June 2003 No 57 § 2). Accordingly, Norway unilaterally increased the 
geographic reach of the Svalbard Treaty from 4 nautical miles to 12 nau-
tical miles (in 2003). Neither signatories nor parties to the treaty objected 
to the Norwegian decision. 
Does the EEA agreement apply to the FPZ and continental shelf be-
yond the Svalbard territorial waters? The answer derives from the 1982 
LOSC Part XI, article 76: the ‘natural prolongation of its land territory’, 
ie the physical continental shelf of Norway which embraces the entire 
plateau of Norway’s mainland, stretching out north – including Svalbard 
and continuing up to the margin of the Arctic Ocean – the deep seabed 
area. Since the UN Continental Shelf Commission recognised the Norwe-
gian claim,126 the Norwegian proposed outer line for the national conti-
nental shelf is de facto and de jure valid.  
126 Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) (n 11).
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How to understand the concept of ‘territories of … Norway’ as codi-
fied in article 126(1) EEA: ‘The Agreement shall apply … to the territories 
of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway’? 
The original Norwegian position is that ‘territory’ relates to the entire land 
base as well as the territorial sea. The EEA does not include areas beyond 
the territorial sea such as the exclusive economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf. Norway, however, failed in domestic courts to gain support for 
this position. The justification in the Leinebris case related to Norway’s 
requirements for the nationality of a crew which contradicted the basic 
principle of free movement of persons (article 28 EEA) was that:  
Even though the EEA, article 126 paragraph 1, relates to the appli-
cation of the agreement in the actual countries’ territories, the High 
Court finds it a too formalistic interpretation to claim that areas 
beyond the territorial sea are excluded from the EEA agreement … 
In respect of the geographic reach of the EEA agreement, the High 
Court is supportive of the ESA [EFTA Surveillance Agency] conclu-
sive remark in the opening letter stating that sailors’ conditions of 
employment should apply also within the Exclusive Economic Zone  
[EEZ] of Norway due to the fact that sailors’ working conditions on 
board are sufficiently closely attached to the EEA territory.127
Since Svalbard – within the territorial sea – is exempt from the EEA 
agreement, this means that the entire continental shelf, the EEZ of main-
land Norway, the Jan Mayen Fisheries Zone, and the FPZ of Svalbard are 
part of the EEA agreement, as resulting from the ‘Leinebris case’.  
No EU objections arose either to the extension of the Svalbard terri-
torial sea to 12 nautical miles, the High Court 2006 decision or the UN’s 
continental shelf decision of 2009. Consequently, the court-endorsed 
ESA position is supportive of the Norway position on the limited geo-
graphic reach of the Svalbard Treaty.  
3 Concluding remarks  
‘The Government will seek international acceptance of 
Norwegian views on Svalbard, fishing zones, oil and gas 
extraction and sound environmental management’.128
The Treaty irrevocably furnished Norway with exclusive sovereignty over 
Svalbard. It includes no redemption, cancellation or revision procedure. 
127 Frostating High Court decision of 21 September 2006 (Leinebris case) LF-2006-24118, 9. 
The decision was appealed to the Norway Supreme Court. However, the Norwegian govern-
ment withdraw its appeal one week before the court negotiations were scheduled to start.
128 The Office of the Prime Minister, 2007 Report; Soria Moria Declaration <www.regjer-
ingen.no/en/dep/smk/documents/Reports-and-action-plans/rapporter/2005/The-Soria-
Moria-Declaration-on-Internati.html?id=438515> accessed 29 May 2013.  
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Thus, subsequent ‘creeping’ jurisdiction due to new developments 
cannot creep up on Norway. And neither can they creep up concerning 
Svalbard. Whether advances in LOSC involve use of the sea, whether the 
developments are good or bad, whether they might otherwise benefit or 
burden Norway – if they apply – is irrelevant. They do not.
Norway’s sovereignty is nothing special, in the sense that the right 
to decide is, as in all other nations, a residual right, and not a ‘special’ 
kind of sovereignty. This right belongs to the sovereign, regardless of how 
original acquisition occurred. The contracting parties cannot repeal Nor-
wegian provisions governing life on Svalbard.
Svalbard is part of the Kingdom of Norway, just as Hawaii is part of 
the US. Norway enjoys jurisdiction in Svalbard, as does the US in Hawaii. 
The several states and Indian tribes of the United States, some of which 
enjoy on behalf of their inhabitants special rights of harvest within the 
territorial sea according to the accession treaties, failed to benefit from 
the 1970s development of the LOS.
The Treaty has neither a time limit nor any withdrawal clause. Even 
though contracting states parties may withdraw from the Treaty, this 
move cannot reverse the sovereignty of Norway. It contains no clause of 
reversal. If such a ‘volte-face’ should take place, Norway, as one of the 
states parties, must agree.
Some critics of Norway confuse economic rights with jurisdictional 
rights, ie the right to harvest with the jurisdictions of the sovereign state. 
This is a common mistake, after all. The right to decide if and how to gov-
ern, ie to conduct legislative, surveillance and hold enforcement power, is 
different from the right to trade, fish and harvest. The equal rights stipu-
lation which does not include the right to decide how to govern belongs 
exclusively to Norway. Sovereignty is ‘full and absolute’.
Another explanation for the interpretative stances adopted by critics 
is the ‘logical’ and ‘natural’ deduction from what might have been the 
plenipotentiaries’ common intention if future development under the Law 
of the Sea were known to the representatives. In support, they allege that 
the 1920 Treaty contains evolutionary concepts, directing dynamic inter-
pretation. However, neither the representatives’ intentions nor the treaty 
text itself champions this position.
In accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Treaty, 
future economic activities and gains within its geographic scope are pro-
tected, but the Treaty cannot be interpreted to confer these rights also 
in contiguous marine areas outside its geographic scope. It is beyond 
dispute that the Treaty protected the Member States’ going concern, fu-
ture economic activity and gains. According to the Treaty, these rights 
are protected, but only within the geographic scope of the Treaty. Hence, 
deep seabed mining, oil drilling or high seas fishing do not constitute pro-
tected ‘equal rights’ granted to the parties of the Svalbard Treaty.
